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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES & RULES 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 4 
(bXl)(a) a motion for judgment under Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; 
(bXIXQ a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; 
(bXIXD) a motion for a new trial under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure; or 
Rule 11 
(dX2) Civil cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua 
sponte motion or motion of a party, the clerk of the trial court shall include all 
of the papers in a civil case as part of the record on appeal. 
(e)(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged rinding or 
conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or 
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall 
include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or 
conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated to correct appellant's 
deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript. 
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made or when 
transcript is unavailable. If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing 
or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, or if the appellant is 
impecunious and unable to afford a transcript in a civil case, the appellant may 
prepare a statement of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, 
including recollection. The statement shall be served on the appellee, who may 
serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days after service. The 
statement and any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the 
trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and approved, shall be 
included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal. 
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(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as to whether 
the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be 
submitted to and settled by that court and the record made to conform to the truth. 
If anything material to either party is omitted from the record by error or accident 
or is misstated, the parties by stipulation, the trial court, or the appellate court, 
either before or after the record is transmitted, may direct that the omission or 
misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a supplemental record be certified 
and transmitted. The moving party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, 
shall serve on the parties a statement of the proposed changes. Within 10 days 
after service, any party may serve objections to the proposed changes. All other 
questions as to the form and content of the record shall be presented to the 
appellate court. 
Rule 12 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any 
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall 
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the 
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack 
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) 
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of 
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to 
join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be made 
before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection is 
waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a 
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such 
motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse 
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert 
at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion 
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are 
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall 
be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a 
motion by Rule 56. 
Rule 42 
(e) Subsequent proceedings before Court of Appeals. Upon receipt by the Clerk 
of the Court of Appeals of the order of transfer and the entry thereof upon the 
docket of the Court of Appeals, the case shall proceed before the Court of 
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Appeals to final decision and disposition as in other appellate cases pursuant to 
these rules. 
Utah Rules Civil Procedure 
Rule 10 
(g) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an original pleading or paper filed in 
any action or proceeding is lost, the court may, upon motion, with or without 
notice, authorize a copy thereof to be filed and used in lieu of the original. 
Rule 50 
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Whenever a motion for a 
directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence is denied or for any reason is 
not granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to the jury subject to 
a later determination of the legal questions raised by the motion. Not later than 
ten days after entry of judgment, a party who has moved for a directed verdict 
may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon set aside and to 
have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict; or if 
a verdict was not returned such party, within ten days after the jury has been 
discharged, may move for judgment in accordance with his motion for a directed 
verdict. A motion for a new trial may be joined with this motion, or a new trial 
may be prayed for in the alternative, [fa verdict was returned the court may allow 
the judgment to stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new trial or 
direct the entry of judgment as if the requested verdict had been directed. If no 
verdict was returned the court may direct the entry of judgment as if the requested 
verdict had been directed or may order a new trial 
Rule 59 
(a)(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that 
it is against law. (a)(7) Error in law. 
Rule 74 
(a) An attorney may withdraw from the case by filing with the court and serving 
on all parties a notice of withdrawal. The notice of withdrawal shall include 
the address of the attorney's client and a statement that no motion is pending 
and no hearing or trial has been set. If a motion is pending or a hearing or trial 
has been set, an attorney may not withdraw except upon motion and order of 
the court. The motion to withdraw shall describe the nature of any pending 
motion and the date and purpose of any scheduled hearing or trial. 
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(c) If an attorney withdraws other than under subdivision (b), dies, is suspended 
from the practice of law, is disbarred, or is removed from the case by the court, the 
opposing party shall serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on the 
unrepresented party, informing the party of the responsibility to appear personally 
or appoint counsel. A copy of the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel must be 
filed with the court. No further proceedings shall be held in the case until 20 days 
after filing the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel unless the unrepresented party 
waives the time requirement or unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
Rules of Evidence 
Rule 103 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a 
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of 
the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely 
objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific 
ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the 
context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the 
substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which questions were asked. Once the 
court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding 
evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or 
offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal. 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any other or 
further statement which shows the character of the evidence, the form 
in which it was offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It 
may direct the making of an offer in question and answer form. 
(c) Hearing of jury. Injury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to 
the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from 
being suggested to the jury by any means, such as making statements or 
offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain 
errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the 
attention of the court. 
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
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(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of 
adjudicative facts, (b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be 
one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either 
(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) 
capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether 
requested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested 
by a party and supplied with the necessary information. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request 
to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice 
and the tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, 
the request may be made after judicial notice has been taken. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence 
inadmissible 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by 
the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of 
Utah, statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of 
this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, 
confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; 
exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or 
a trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(a)(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, 
as provided in Rules 607,608, and 609. 
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Rule 502 
(b) Communications. 
(1) Definition. A communication is confidential if it is made privately 
by any person to his or her spouse and is not intended for disclosure 
to any other person. 
(2) General rule of privilege. An individual has a privilege during the 
person's life to refuse to testify or to prevent his or her spouse or 
former spouse from testifying as to any confidential communication 
made by the individual to the spouse during their marriage and to 
prevent another from disclosing any such confidential 
communication. 
(3) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the 
person who made the confidential communication, or by the person's 
guardian or conservator. The non-communicating spouse to whom 
the confidential communication was made is presumed to be 
authorized, during the life of the communicating spouse, to claim 
the privilege on behalf of the person who made the confidential 
communication. 
(4) Exceptions. No privilege exists under subparagraph (b) of this rule: 
(A) Spouses as adverse parties. In any civil proceeding in which 
the spouses are adverse parties; 
(B) Furtherance of crime or tort. As to any communication which 
was made, in whole or in part, to enable or aid anyone 
(i) to commit, 
(ii) to plan to commit, or 
(iii) to conceal a crime or a tort; 
(C) Spouse charged with crime or tort. In a proceeding in which 
one spouse is charged with a crime or a tort against the 
person or property of 
(ii) a child of either, 
Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of witness. 
Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to misrepresent may be 
shown to impeach the witness either by examination of the witness or by 
evidence otherwise adduced. 
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Rule 903. 
The testimony of a subscribing witness is not necessary to authenticate a 
writing unless required by the laws of the jurisdiction whose laws govern the 
validity of the writing. 
Utah Code Annotated/Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103 (2)(h)(a) 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
* • 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, 
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, properly division, 
child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10 (l)(a)(i-vi) (d) (e), (2), (3) 
(a) In determining any form of custody, the court shall consider the 
best interests of the child and, among other factors the court finds 
relevant, the following: 
(i) the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each 
of the parties; 
(ii) which parent is most likely to act in the best interest of the 
child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact 
with the noncustodial parent; 
(iii) the extent of bonding between the parent and child, 
meaning the depth, quality, and nature of the relationship between 
a parent and child; and 
(iv) those factors outlined in Section 30-3-10.2. 
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other factors the 
court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to act in the best interests of 
the child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with 
the noncustodial parent as the court finds appropriate. 
(b) If a court takes a parent's disability into account in awarding 
custody or determining whether a substantial change has occurred 
for the purpose of modifying an award of custody, the parent with a 
xi 
xii 
disability may rebut any evidence, presumption, or inference 
arising from the disability by showing that: 
(i) the disability does not significantly or substantially inhibit 
the parent's ability to provide for the physical and emotional 
needs of the child at issue; or 
(ii) the parent with a disability has sufficient human, monetary, 
or other resources available to supplement the parent's ability to 
provide for the physical and emotional needs of the child at issue. 
(3) If the court finds that one parent does not desire custody of the 
child, or has attempted to permanently relinquish custody to a third 
party, it shall take that evidence into consideration in determining 
whether to award custody to the other parent. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), a court may not 
discriminate against a parent due to a disability, as defined in 
Section 57-21-2, in awarding custody or determining whether a 
substantial change has occurred for the purpose of modifying an 
award of custody. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10.1 (l)(a-e) 
(1) "Joint legal custody": 
(a) means the sharing of the rights, privileges, duties, and powers of 
a parent by both parents, where specified; 
(b) may include an award of exclusive authority by the court to one 
parent to make specific decisions; 
(c) does not affect the physical custody of the child except as 
specified in the order of joint legal custody; 
(d) is not based on awarding equal or nearly equal periods of 
physical custody of and access to the child to each of the parents, as the 
best interest of the child often requires that a primary physical 
residence for the child be designated; and 
(e) does not prohibit the court from specifying one parent as the 
primary caretaker and one home as the primary residence of the child. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.3 (l)(a)(d)(e), (3), (4), (6), (7) 
(1) Unless the court orders otherwise, before a final order of joint legal 
custody or joint physical custody is entered both parties shall attend the 
mandatory course for divorcing parents, as provided in Section 30-3-
11.3, and present a certificate of completion from the course to the court. 
xii 
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(a) either the county of residence of the child, until altered by 
further order of the court, or the custodian who has the sole legal 
right to determine the residence of the child; 
(d) provisions to minimize disruption of the child's attendance at 
school and other activities, his daily routine, and his association 
with friends; and 
(e) as necessary, the remaining parental rights, privileges, duties, 
and powers to be exercised by the parents solely, concurrently, or jointly. 
(3) The court shall, where possible, include in the order the terms of the 
parenting plan provided in accordance with Section 30-3-10.8. 
(4) Any parental rights not specifically addressed by the court order may be 
exercised by the parent having physical custody of the child the majority of 
the time. 
(6) An order of joint legal custody, in itself, is not grounds for modifying a 
support order. 
(7) An order of joint legal or physical custody shall require a parenting plan 
incorporating a dispute resolution procedure the parties agree to use before 
seeking enforcement or modification of the terms and conditions of the order 
of joint legal or physical custody through litigation, except in emergency 
situations requiring ex parte orders to protect the child. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4 (l)(a) (c)(i)(ii), (2-5) 
(1) On the petition of one or both of the parents, or the joint legal or physical 
custodians if they are not the parents, the court may, after a hearing, modify or 
terminate an order that established joint legal or physical custody if: 
(a) the verified petition or accompanying affidavit initially alleges that 
admissible evidence will show that the circumstances of the child or one 
or both parents or joint legal or physical custodians have materially and 
substantially changed since the entry of the order to be modified; 
(c) (i) both parents have complied in good faith with the dispute 
resolution procedure in accordance with Subsection 30-3-10.3(7); or 
(ii) if no dispute resolution procedure is contained in the order that 
established joint legal or physical custody, the court orders the parents 
to participate in a dispute resolution procedure in accordance with 
Subsection 30-3-10.2(5) unless the parents certify that, in good faith, 
they have utilized a dispute resolution procedure to resolve their 
dispute. 
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(2) (a) In determining whether the best interest of a child will be served by 
either modifying or terminating the joint legal or physical custody order, 
the court shall, in addition to other factors the court considers relevant, 
consider the factors outlined in Section 30-3-10 and Subsection 30-3-
10.2(2). 
(b) The court shall make specific written findings on each of the factors 
relied upon stating: 
(i) a material and substantial change of circumstance has occurred; 
and 
(ii) a modification of the terms and conditions of the order would be 
an improvement for and in the best interest of the child. 
(c) The court shall give substantial weight to the existing joint legal or 
physical custody order when the child is thriving, happy, and well-
adjusted. 
(3) The court shall, in every case regarding a motion for termination of a 
joint legal or physical custody order, consider reasonable alternatives to 
preserve the existing order in accordance with Subsection 30-3-10(l)(b). 
The court may modify the terms and conditions of the existing order in 
accordance with Subsection 30-3-10(5) and may order the parents to file a 
parenting plan in accordance with this chapter. 
(4) A parent requesting a modification from sole custody to joint legal 
custody or joint physical custody or both, or any other type of shared 
parenting arrangement, shall file and serve a proposed parenting plan with 
the petition to modify in accordance with Section 30-3-10.8. 
(5) If the court finds that an action under this section is filed or answered 
frivolously and in a manner designed to harass the other party, the court 
shall assess attorney fees as costs against the offending party. 
UCAS 30-3-10.7. (2) (3) 
(2) "Parenting plan" means a plan for parenting a child, including 
allocation of parenting functions, which is incorporated in any final decree 
or decree of modification including an action for dissolution of marriage, 
annulment, legal, separation, or paternity. 
(3) "Parenting functions" means those aspects of the parent-child 
relationship in which the parent makes decisions and performs functions 
necessary for the care and growth of the child. Parenting functions include: 
(a) maintaining a loving, stable, consistent, and nurturing relationship 
with the child; 
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(b) attending to the daily needs of the child, such as feeding, clothing, 
physical care, grooming, supervision, health care, day care, and engaging 
in other activities which are appropriate to the developmental level of the 
child and that are within the social and economic circumstances of the 
particular family; 
(c) attending to adequate education for the child, including remedial or 
other education essential to the best interest of the child; 
(d) assisting the child in developing and maintaining appropriate 
interpersonal relationships; 
(e) exercising appropriate judgment regarding the child's welfare, 
consistent with the child's developmental level and family social and 
economic circumstances; and 
(f) providing for the financial support of the child. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.8 (1-7) 
(1) In any proceeding under this chapter, including actions for paternity, any 
party requesting joint custody, joint legal or physical custody, or any other 
type of shared parenting arrangement, shall file and serve a proposed 
parenting plan at the time of the filing of their original petition or at the time 
of filing their answer or counterclaim. 
(2) In proceedings for a modification of custody provisions or modification of 
a parenting plan, a proposed parenting plan shall be filed and served with the 
petition to modify, or the answer or counterclaim to the petition to modify. 
(3) A party who files a proposed parenting plan in compliance with this 
section may move the court for an order of default to adopt the plan if the 
other party fails to file a proposed parenting plan as required by this section. 
(4) Either party may file and serve an amended proposed parenting plan 
according to the rules for amending pleadings. 
(5) The parent submitting a proposed parenting plan shall attach a verified 
statement that the plan is proposed by that parent in good faith. 
(6) Both parents may submit a parenting plan which has been agreed upon. 
A verified statement, signed by both parents, shall be attached. 
(7) If the parents file inconsistent parenting plans, the court may appoint a 
guardian ad litem to represent the best interests of the child, who may, if 
necessary, file a separate parenting plan reflecting the best interests of the 
child. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.9 (l)(a-g), (2-4)(a)(e), (5), (6-9) 
XV 
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(1) The objectives of a parenting plan are to: 
(a) provide for the child's physical care; 
(b) maintain the child's emotional stability; 
(c) provide for the child's changing needs as the child grows and 
matures in a way that minimizes the need for future modifications to the 
parenting plan; 
(d) set forth the authority and responsibilities of each parent with 
respect to the child consistent with the definitions outlined in this 
chapter; 
(e) minimize the child's exposure to harmful parental conflict; 
(f) encourage the parents, where appropriate, to meet the responsibilities 
to their minor children through agreements in the parenting plan rather 
than relying on judicial intervention; and 
(g) protect the best interests of the child. 
(2) The parenting plan shall contain provisions for resolution of future 
disputes between the parents, allocation of decision-making authority, and 
residential provisions for the child, and provisions addressing notice and 
parent-time responsibilities in the event of the relocation of either party. It 
may contain other provisions comparable to those in Sections 30-3-5 and 
30-3-10.3 regarding the welfare of the child. 
(3) A process for resolving disputes shall be provided unless precluded or 
limited by statute. A dispute resolution process may include: 
(a) counseling; 
(b) mediation or arbitration by a specified individual or agency; or 
(c) court action. 
(4) In the dispute resolution process: 
(a) preference shall be given to the provisions in the parenting plan; 
(e) if the court finds that a parent has used or frustrated the dispute 
resolution process without good reason, the court may award attorney's 
fees and financial sanctions to the prevailing parent; 
(f) the district court shall have the right of review from the dispute 
resolution process; and 
(g) the provisions of this Subsection (4) shall be set forth in any final 
decree or order. 
(5) The parenting plan shall allocate decision-making authority to one or 
both parties regarding the children's education, health care, and religious 
upbringing. The parties may incorporate an agreement related to the care 
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and growth of the children in these specified areas or in other areas into 
their plan, consistent with the criteria outlined in Subsection 30-3-10.7(2) 
and Subsection (1). Regardless of the allocation of decision-making in the 
parenting plan, either parent may make emergency decisions affecting the 
health or safety of the child. 
(7) When mutual decision-making is designated but cannot be achieved, the 
parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve the issue through the dispute 
resolution process. 
(8) The plan shall include a residential schedule which designates in which 
parent's home each minor child shall reside on given days of the year, 
including provisions for holidays, birthdays of family members, vacations, 
and other special occasions. 
(9) If a parent fails to comply with a provision of the parenting plan or a 
child support order, the other parent's obligations under the parenting plan 
or the child support order are not affected. Failure to comply with a 
provision of the parenting plan or a child support order may result in a 
finding of contempt of court. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10.10 (3)(4) 
(3) If the court orders parent-time and a protective order or civil stalking 
injunction is still in place, it shall consider whether to order the parents to 
conduct parent-time pick-up and transfer through a third party. The parent 
who is the stated victim in the order or injunction may submit to the court, 
and the court shall consider, the name of a person considered suitable to act 
as the third party. 
(4) If the court orders the parents to conduct parent-time through a third 
party, the parenting plan shall specify the time, day, place, manner, and the 
third party to be used to implement the exchange. 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-11.3 (4) 
(4) The court may require unmarried parents to attend this educational course 
when those parents are involved in a visitation or custody proceeding before 
the court. 
(5) The mandatory course shall instruct both parties: 
(a) about divorce and its impacts on: 
(i) their child or children; 
(ii) their family relationship; and 
(iii) their financial responsibilities for their child or children; and 
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(b) that domestic violence has a harmful effect on children and family 
relationships. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-11.4 (1-4), (6), (11) 
(1) There is established a mandatory divorce orientation course for all parties 
with minor children who file a petition for temporary separation or for a 
divorce. A couple with no minor children are not required, but may choose to 
attend the course. The purpose of the course shall be to educate parties about 
the divorce process and reasonable alternatives. 
(2) A petitioner shall attend a divorce orientation course no more than 60 days 
after filing a petition for divorce. 
(3) The respondent shall attend the divorce orientation course no more than 30 
days after being served with a petition for divorce. 
(4) The clerk of the court shall provide notice to a petitioner of the 
requirement for the course, and information regarding the course shall be 
included with the petition or motion, when served on the respondent. 
(6) The course may be provided in conjunction with the mandatory course for 
divorcing parents required by Section 30-3-11.3. 
(11) Both parties shall attend a divorce orientation course before a divorce 
decree may be entered, unless waived by the court. A certificate of 
completion constitutes evidence to the court of course completion by the 
parties. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-12. Courts to Exercise Family Counseling 
Matters. 
Each district court of the respective judicial districts, while sitting in 
matters of divorce, annulment, separate maintenance, child custody, 
alimony and support in connection therewith, child custody in habeas 
corpus proceedings, and adoptions, shall exercise the family counseling 
powers conferred by this act. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-32 
(1) It is the intent of the Legislature to promote parent-time at a level 
consistent with all parties' interests. 
(2)(a) A court shall consider as primary the safety and well-being of the 
child and the parent who is the victim of domestic or family violence. 
(b) Absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence of real harm or 
substantiated potential harm to the child: 
(i) it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing, divorced, or 
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adjudicated parents to have frequent, meaningful, and continuing access to 
each parent following separation or divorce; 
(ii) each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parent is entitled to and 
responsible for frequent, meaningful, and continuing access with his child 
consistent with the child's best interests; and 
(iii) it is in the best interests of the child to have both parents actively 
involved in parenting the child. 
(c) An order issued by a court pursuant to Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, 
Cohabitant Abuse Act shall be considered evidence of real harm or 
substantiated potential harm to the child. 
(3) For purposes of Sections 30-3-32 through 30-3-37: 
(a) "Child" means the child or children of divorcing, separating, or 
adjudicated parents. 
(b) "Christmas school vacation" means the time period beginning on the 
evening the child gets out of school for the Christmas or winter school 
break until the evening before the child returns to school. 
(c) "Extended parent-time" means a period of parent-time other man a 
weekend, holiday as provided in Subsections 30-3-35(2)(f) and (2)(g), 
religious holidays as provided in Subsections 30-3-33(3) and (17), and 
"Christmas school vacation." 
(d) "Surrogate care" means care by any individual other man the parent 
of the child. 
(e) "Uninterrupted time" means parent-time exercised by one parent 
without interruption at any time by the presence of the other parent. 
(f) "Virtual parent-time" means parent-time facilitated by tools such as 
telephone, email, instant messaging, video conferencing, and other wired 
or wireless technologies over the Internet or other communication media to 
supplement in-person visits between a noncustodial parent and a child or 
between a child and the custodial parent when the child is staying with the 
noncustodial parent. Virtual parent-time is designed to supplement, not 
replace, in-person parent-time. 
(4) If a parent relocates because of an act of domestic violence or family 
violence by the other parent, the court shall make specific findings and 
orders with regards to the application of Section 30-3-37. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-33 Advisory Guidelines. 
In addition to the parent-time schedules provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 
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30-3-35.5, the following advisory guidelines are suggested to govern all 
parent-time arrangements between parents. 
(1) Parent-time schedules mutually agreed upon by both parents are 
preferable to a court-imposed solution. 
(2) The parent-time schedule shall be utilized to maximize the continuity 
and stability of the child's life. 
(3) Special consideration shall be given by each parent to make the child 
available to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, family 
reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies, and other significant 
events in the life of the child or in the life of either parent which may 
inadvertently conflict with the parent-time schedule. 
(4) The responsibility for the pick up, delivery, and return of the child shall 
be determined by the court when the parent-time order is entered, and may 
be changed at any time a subsequent modification is made to the parent-
time order. 
(5) If the noncustodial parent will be providing transportation, the custodial 
parent shall have the child ready for parent-time at the time the child is to 
be picked up and shall be present at the custodial home or shall make 
reasonable alternate arrangements to receive the child at the time the child 
is returned. 
(6) If the custodial parent will be transporting the child, the noncustodial 
parent shall be at the appointed place at the time the noncustodial parent is 
to receive the child, and have the child ready to be picked up at the 
appointed time and place, or have made reasonable alternate arrangements 
for the custodial parent to pick up the child. 
(7) Regular school hours may not be interrupted for a school-age child for 
the exercise of parent-time by either parent. 
(8) The court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to 
reasonably accommodate the work schedule of both parents and may 
increase the parent-time allowed to the noncustodial parent but shall not 
diminish the standardized parent-time provided in Sections 30-3-35 and 
30-3-35.5. 
(9) The court may make alterations in the parent-time schedule to 
reasonably accommodate the distance between the parties and the expense 
of exercising parent-time. 
(10) Neither parent-time nor child support is to be withheld due to either 
parent's failure to comply with a court-ordered parent-time schedule. 
(11) The custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent within 24 
hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, sports, and 
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community functions in which the child is participating or being honored, 
and the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend and participate fully. 
(12) The noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all school reports 
including preschool and daycare reports and medical records and shall be 
notified immediately by the custodial parent in the event of a medical 
emergency. 
(13) Each parent shall provide the other with his current address and 
telephone number, email address, and other virtual parent-time access 
information within 24 hours of any change. 
(14) Each parent shall permit and encourage, during reasonable hours, 
reasonable and uncensored communications with the child, in the form of 
mail privileges and virtual parent-time if the equipment is reasonably 
available, provided that if the parties cannot agree on whether the 
equipment is reasonably available, the court shall decide whether the 
equipment for virtual parent-time is reasonably available, taking into 
consideration: 
(a) the best interests of the child; 
(b) each parent's ability to handle any additional expenses for virtual 
parent-time; and, 
(b)any other factors the court considers material. 
(15) Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child than 
surrogate care and the court shall encourage the parties to cooperate in 
allowing the noncustodial parent, if willing and able to transport the 
children, to provide the child care. Child care arrangements existing 
during the marriage are preferred as are child care arrangements with 
nominal or no charge. 
(16) Each parent shall provide all surrogate care providers with the name, 
current address, and telephone number of the other parent and shall 
provide the noncustodial parent with the name, current address, and 
telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court for 
good cause orders otherwise. 
(17) Each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major religious 
holidays celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a 
religious holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall have the 
right to be together with the child on the religious holiday. 
(18) If the child is on a different parent-time schedule than a sibling, 
based on Sections 30-3-35 and 30-3-35.5, the parents should consider if 
an upward deviation for parent-time with all the minor children so that 
parent-time is uniform between school aged and nonschool aged children, 
is appropriate. 
xxi 
xxii 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-35 Minimum schedule for parent-time for 
children 5 to 18 years of age. 
(1) The parent-time schedule in this section applies to children 5 to 18 years 
of age. 
(2) If the parties do not agree to a parent-time schedule, the following 
schedule shall be considered the minimum parent-time to which the 
noncustodial parent and the child shall be entitled. 
(a)(i)(A) One weekday evening to be specified by the noncustodial parent 
or the court, or Wednesday evening if not specified, from 5:30 p.m. until 
8:30 p.m.; 
(B) at the election of the noncustodial parent, one weekday from the 
time the child's school is regularly dismissed until 8:30 p.m., unless the court 
directs the application of Subsection (2)(a)(i); or 
(C) at the election of the noncustodial parent, if school is not in 
session, one weekday from approximately 9 a.m., accommodating the 
custodial parent's work schedule, until 8:30 p.m. if the noncustodial parent is 
available to be with the child, unless the court directs the application of 
Subsection (2)(a)(i)(A) or (2)(a)(i)(B). 
(ii) Once the election of the weekday for the weekday evening parent-
time is made, it may not be changed except by mutual written agreement or 
court order. 
(b)(i)(A) Alternating weekends beginning on the first weekend after the 
entry of the decree from 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday continuing 
each year; 
(B) at the election of the noncustodial parent, from the time the 
child's school is regularly dismissed on Friday until 7 p.m. on Sunday, 
unless the court directs the application of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(A); or 
(C) at the election of the noncustodial parent, if school is not in 
session, on Friday from approximately 9 a.m., accommodating the custodial 
parent's work schedule, until 7 p.m. on Sunday, if the noncustodial parent is 
available to be with the child unless the court directs the application of 
Subsection (2)(b)(i)(A) or (2)(b)(i)(B). 
(ii) A step-parent, grandparent, or other responsible adult designated 
by the noncustodial parent, may pick up the child if the custodial parent is 
aware of the identity of the individual, and the parent will be with the child 
by 7 p.m. 
(iii) Elections should be made by the noncustodial parent at the time of 
entry of the divorce decree or court order, and may be changed by mutual 
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agreement, court order, or by the noncustodial parent in the event of a 
change in the child's schedule. 
(iv) Weekends include any "snow" days, teacher development days, or 
other days when school is not scheduled and which are contiguous to the 
weekend period. 
(c) Holidays include any "snow" days, teacher development days, or 
other days when school is not scheduled, contiguous to the holiday period, 
and take precedence over the weekend parent-time. Changes may not be 
made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend parent-time 
schedule; however, birthdays take precedence over holidays and extended 
parent-time, except Mother's Day and Father's Day; birthdays do not take 
precedence over uninterrupted parent-time if the parent exercising 
uninterrupted time takes the child away from that parent's residence for the 
uninterrupted extended parent-time. 
(d) If a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the 
noncustodial parent shall be responsible for the child's attendance at school 
for that school day. 
(e)(i) If a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the 
total holiday period extends beyond that time so that the child is free from 
school and the parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be 
entitled to this lengthier holiday period. 
(ii)(A) At the election of the noncustodial parent, parent-time over a 
scheduled holiday weekend may begin from the time the child's school is 
regularly dismissed at the beginning of the holiday weekend until 7 p.m. on 
the last day of the holiday weekend; or 
(B) at the election of the noncustodial parent, if school is not in 
session, parent-time over a scheduled holiday weekend may begin at 
approximately 9 a.m., accommodating the custodial parent's work 
schedule, the first day of the holiday weekend until 7 p.m. on the last day 
of the holiday weekend, if the noncustodial parent is available to be with 
the child unless the court directs the application of Subsection (2)(e)(ii)(A). 
(iii) A step-parent, grandparent, or other responsible individual 
designated by the noncustodial parent, may pick up the child if the 
custodial parent is aware of the identity of the individual, and the parent 
will be with the child by 7 p.m. 
(iv) Elections should be made by the noncustodial parent at the time 
of the divorce decree or court order, and may be changed by mutual 
agreement, court order, or by the noncustodial parent in the event of a 
change in the child's schedule. 
(f) In years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is entitled 
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to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate 
beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial 
parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) Martin Luther King, Jr. beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday 
at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) spring break beginning at 6 p.m. on the day school lets out for 
the holiday until 7 p.m. on the Sunday before school resumes; 
(iv) July 4 beginning 6 p.m. the day before the holiday until 11 p.m. 
or no later than 6 p.m. on the day following the holiday, at the option of the 
parent exercising the holiday; 
(v) Labor Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 p.m., 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(vi) the fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. 
weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7 p.m. unless 
the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial 
parent is completely entitled; 
(vii) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday; and 
(viii) the first portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined in 
Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b) including Christmas Eve and Christmas Day 
until 1 p.m. on the day halfway through the holiday, if there are an odd 
number of days for the holiday period, or until 7 p.m. if there are an even 
number of days for the holiday period, so long as the entire holiday is 
equally divided. 
(g) In years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is 
entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 
p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other 
siblings along for the birthday; 
(ii) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until 7 p.m. on 
Monday unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iii) Memorial Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 7 
p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
(iv) July 24 beginning at 6 p.m. on the day before the holiday until 11 
p.m. or no later than 6 p.m. on the day following the holiday, at the option 
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of the parent exercising the holiday; 
(v) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 7 p.m. on the holiday; 
(vi) Halloween on October 31 or the day Halloween is traditionally 
celebrated in the local community from after school until 9 p.m. if on a 
school day, or from 4 p.m. until 9 p.m.; 
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7 p.m. until 
Sunday at 7 p.m.; and 
(viii) the second portion of the Christmas school vacation as defined 
in Subsection 30-3-32(3)(b), beginning 1 p.m. on the day halfway through 
the holiday, if there are an odd number of days for the holiday period, or at 
7 p.m. if there are an even number of days for the holiday period, so long 
as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided. 
(h) The custodial parent is entitled to the odd year holidays in even 
years and the even year holidays in odd years. 
(i) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive father every 
year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday. 
(j) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or adoptive mother 
every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on the holiday. 
(k) Extended parent-time with the noncustodial parent may be: 
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial 
parent, including weekends normally exercised by the noncustodial parent, 
but not holidays; 
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial 
parent; and 
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject to parent-time for the 
custodial parent for weekday parent-time but not weekends, except for a 
holiday to be exercised by the other parent. 
(1) The custodial parent shall have an identical two-week period of 
uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation from school for 
purposes of vacation. 
(m) Both parents shall provide notification of extended parent-time or 
vacation weeks with the child at least 30 days in advance to the other 
parent and if notification is not provided timely the complying parent may 
determine the schedule for extended parent-time for the non-complying 
parent. 
(n) Telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours and for a reasonable 
duration. 
(o) Virtual parent-time, if the equipment is reasonably available and the 
parents reside at least 100 miles apart, shall be at reasonable hours and for 
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reasonable duration, provided that if the parties cannot agree on whether 
the equipment is reasonably available, the court shall decide whether the 
equipment for virtual parent-time is reasonably available, taking into 
consideration: 
(i) the best interests of the child; 
(ii) each parent's ability to handle any additional expenses for virtual 
parent-time; and 
(iii) any other factors the court considers material. 
(3) Any elections required to be made in accordance with this section by 
either parent concerning parent-time shall be made a part of the decree and 
made a part of the parent-time order. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(e)(i), the Halloween holiday may not 
be extended beyond the hours designated in Subsection (2)(g)(vi). 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-37 Relocation. 
(1) For purposes of this section, "relocation" means moving from the state 
or 150 miles or more from the residence specified in the court's decree. 
(2) The relocating parent shall provide, if possible, 60 days advance written 
notice of the intended relocation to the other parent. The written notice of 
relocation shall contain statements affirming the following: 
(a) the parent-time provisions in Subsection (5) or a schedule approved 
by both parties will be followed; and 
(b) neither parent will interfere with the other's parental rights pursuant 
to court ordered parent-time arrangements, or the schedule approved by 
both parties. 
(3) The court may, upon motion of any party or upon the court's own 
motion, schedule a hearing with notice to review the notice of relocation 
and parent-time schedule as provided in Section 30-3-35 and make 
appropriate orders regarding the parent-time and costs for parent-time 
transportation. 
(4) In determining the parent-time schedule and allocating the 
transportation costs, the court shall consider: 
(a) the reason for the parent's relocation; 
(b) the additional costs or difficulty to both parents in exercising parent-
time; 
(c) the economic resources of both parents; and 
(d) other factors the court considers necessary and relevant. 
(5) Unless otherwise ordered by the court, upon the relocation, as defined 
in Subsection (1), of one of the parties the following schedule shall be the 
minimum requirements for parent-time with a school-age child: 
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(a) in years ending in an odd number, the child shall spend the 
following holidays with the noncustodial parent: 
(i) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday until Sunday; and 
(ii) Spring break, if applicable, beginning the last day of school 
before the holiday until the day before school resumes; 
(b) in years ending in an even number, the child shall spend the 
following holidays with the noncustodial parent: 
(i) the entire winter school break period; and 
(ii) the Fall school break beginning the last day of school before the 
holiday until the day before school resumes; 
(c) extended parent-time equal to 1/2 of the summer or off-track time 
for consecutive weeks. The children should be returned to the custodial 
home no later than seven days before school begins; however, this week 
shall be counted when determining the amount of parent-time to be divided 
between the parents for the summer or off-track period; and 
(d) at the option and expense of the noncustodial parent, one weekend 
per month. 
(6) In the event finances and distance preclude the exercise of minimum 
parent-time for the noncustodial parent during the school year, the court 
should consider awarding more time for the noncustodial parent during the 
summer time if it is in the best interests of the children. 
(7) Upon the motion of any party, the court may order uninterrupted 
parent-time with the noncustodial parent for a minimum of 30 days during 
extended parent-time, unless the court finds it is not in the best interests of 
the child. If the court orders uninterrupted parent-time during a period not 
covered by this section, it shall specify in its order which parent is 
responsible for the child's travel expenses. 
(8) Unless otherwise ordered by the court the relocating party shall be 
responsible for all the child's travel expenses relating to Subsections (5)(a) 
and (b) and 1/2 of the child's travel expenses relating to Subsection (5)(c), 
provided the noncustodial parent is current on all support obligations. If the 
noncustodial parent has been found in contempt for not being current on all 
support obligations, the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for all of 
the child's travel expenses under Subsection (5), unless the court rules 
otherwise. Reimbursement by either responsible party to the other for the 
child's travel expenses shall be made within 30 days of receipt of 
documents detailing those expenses. 
(9) The court may apply this provision to any preexisting decree of 
divorce. 
(10) Any action under this section may be set for an expedited hearing. 
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(11) A parent who fails to comply with the notice of relocation in 
Subsection (2) shall be in contempt of the court's or4er. 
Establishing Court Ordered Paternity: A Guide for Unmarried Parents. 
Case Law 
Utah law makes clear that a determination of whether substantial and material 
changes have occurred is a fact-intensive legal determination that is presumed 
valid and is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
See Young v. Young, 
2009 UT App 3, f 4, 201 P.3d 301. 
DOYLE v. DOYLE, 2009 UT App 306,313 
Section 30-3-10.4 allows a trial court to terminate an 
order of joint legal custody if it determines "that the joint 
legal custody order is unworkable or inappropriate under 
existing circumstances." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4(3) 
(2007). It then mandates that the court "enter an order of sole 
legal custody" and make decisions with respect to "[a]ll 
related issues." Id. (emphasis added). We agree that 
section 30-3-10.4 is a joint "legal" custody statute, s^ e 
Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428,429-33 (Utah 
CtApp. 1991), but explicit in its terms is the direction to 
trial courts to address "[a]ll related issues," Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-3-10.4(3), one of which is obviously physical custody, 
see Catherine R. Albiston, Eleanor E. Maccoby & 
Robert R. Mnookin, Does Joint Legal Custody Matter?, 2 
Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 167,168 (1990) ("There are actually 
three aspects of joint custody: the legal custody agreement, 
the physical custody agreement, and the actual residential 
arrangement for the child."). 
122 Huish also argues that the trial court failed to 
address certain factors set forth in rule 4-903 of the Code of 
Judicial Administration, including the duration of the initial 
physical custody arrangement and child-parent bonding, in 
determining that a change in physical custody was warranted. In 
its Finding 11, the trial court stated: "The Court has 
considered several factors, including the factors set forth in 
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[rule 4-903], in determining custody. Where no findings are 
made with respect to a particular factor, the Court finds that 
the factor is not significant or weighty in this case." 
"Although the court considers many factors, each is not on 
equal footing. Generally, it is within the trial court's 
discretion to determine, based on the facts before it and 
within the confines set by the appellate courts, where a 
particular factor falls within the spectrum of relative 
importance and to accord each factor its appropriate weight." 
Hudema v. Carpenter, 1999 UT App 290, f 26, 
989 P.2d 491. Given the nearly equal parenting time enjoyed by the 
parties over the child's life and expert testimony establishing 
that the parties were equally involved in raising the child, we 
agree with the trial court that, in this case, the factors that 
Huish claims are of pivotal significance — the duration 
of the original physical custody decree and child-parent 
bonding — are not dispositive. 
f 23 Munro's efforts to modify the original custody 
arrangement began after Huish remarried and stated her 
intention to move with the child and her new husband to 
Kwajalein, a remote atoll 2100 nautical miles southwest of 
Honolulu. On the first day of trial, after prodding by the 
trial court, [fii2] Huish advised the court that she had 
reconsidered her intended move and had decided to stay in Utah. 
In its Finding 8, the trial court found that these facts 
constituted an additional basis for finding changed 
circumstances. Huish argues that because she changed her mind 
about the move, it cannot constitute a change of circumstances 
warranting a potential change of custody. We frankly doubt that 
a party can express an intent to do something that would so 
clearly constitute a change in circumstances, then at the 
eleventh hour change her mind about it and later assert that 
because she did not follow through on her expressed intent, 
there is no actual change in circumstances warranting the 
court's considering the child's best interests. But given our 
conclusion that the unworkability of the original custody 
decree is enough to satisfy the changed-circumstances test, we 
need not resolve this issue. 
HUISH v. MUNRO, 2008 UT App 283 
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191 P.3d 1242 
Before modifying a custody order, the court 
conducts a bifurcated inquiry to determine, first, if there has 
been a substantial and material change in the circumstances upon 
which the award was based, and, if so, whether a modification is 
in the best interests of the child. 
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See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.4 
(1998);[m6] Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599,602 (Utah 1989); Sigg v. 
Sigg, 905 P.2d 908,912 & n. 5 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). The required 
finding of changed circumstances promotes the policies of 
preserving stability in the child's relationships and preventing 
the burden on the parties and courts of successive adjudications. 
See Elmer, 776 P.2d at 602. Consequently, the court generally may 
not consider evidence of the child's best interests until it finds 
changed circumstances. See Wright v. Wright, 941 P.2d 646, 650-51 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). However, when a custody order is entered 
pursuant to a stipulated agreement, rather than a pridr 
adjudication of the child's best interests, "the res judicata 
policy underlying the changed-circumstances rule is at a 
particularly low ebb." Elmer, 776 P.2d at 603. See id. at 605. 
f 23 In this case, the trial court ruled there was a substantial and 
material change of circumstances concerning Jackson, Hudema, and 
Carpenter. The court based this determination on various factual 
findings, including that, subsequent to the original custody 
order, both parents had remarried and moved to new communities 
separated by a distance that prohibited Jackson's daily contact 
with both parents, and Jackson had begun school, making extended 
periods of visitation unworkable during most of the year. In light 
of these facts, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion 
in finding changed circumstances. 
HUDEMA v. CARPENTER, 1999 UT App 290 
989 P.2d 491,497-98 
We will uphold a trial court's decision to modify a divorce 
decree if it is within the range of sound discretion.[fill] See 
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah App. 1991). The trial 
court determined that the children should be removed from the 
XXX 
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custody of their mother and placed in their father's custody if 
— but only if— Alicia were to move beyond the boundaries of 
Summit County, Utah.[m2] The focus of the trial court's analysis 
and decision, then, was not on the parties" respective 
parenting skills.[m3] Instead, the court's order can only be taken 
to mean that the trial court believed that the children's 
domicile in Summit County is so essential to their well-being 
that removal from that community would be more detrimental to 
them than separating them from their custodial parent — the 
person who has been primarily responsible for their day-to-day 
care for the entirety of their lives. While such a conclusion 
is not inherently impossible, a factor of considerable 
importance in determining the best interest of children is the 
maintenance of continuity in their lives, and removing children 
from their existing custodial placement 
Page 723 
undercuts that policy.[fh4] See, e.g., Hirsch v. Hirsch, 
725 P.2d 1320,1323 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., concurring); Hutchison 
v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38,41 (Utah 1982); Nielsen v. Nielsen, 
620 P.2d 511,512 (Utah 1980); In re Cooper, 17 Utah 2d 296, 
298-99, 410 P.2d 475,476 (1966); In re Application of Conde, 
10 Utah 2d 25, 29, 347 P.2d 859, 861 (1959); Rosendahl v. 
Rosendahl, 876 P.2d 870, 873 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994); Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 
478-79 (Utah App. 1991); Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 
App. 1990). Therefore, unless there were compelling evidence 
that residing in Summit County, Utah, would be better for the 
children than allowing them to continue to reside with their 
life-long primary caregiver, we would conclude that the trial 
court exceeded the exercise of sound discretion in entering the 
order before us. 
LARSON v. LARSON, 888 P.2d 719,722 (Utah App. 1994) 
In Larson, this court 
reversed a trial court's custody modification, concluding 
that allowing children to remain in their life-long community and 
maintain a relationship with their extended family is insufficient 
justification for removing children from the custody of their 
primary caregiver. See id. at 722, 725-26. Notably, in 
Larson there was no evidence of interference with visitation; 
XXXI 
xxxii 
in fact, the custodial parent had "been extremely flexible in 
coordinating [the noncustodial parent's] visitation." 
Id. at 725. This case is therefore distinguishable fronl 
Larson because the trial court here, as in Sigg, 
"arrange[d] custody in a way that fosters a relationship with both 
parents." See Sigg, 905 P.2d at 917. 
HANSON v. HANSON, 2009 UT App 365,368 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellant contests the Order Re: Petition to Modify Order of Judge Lyle R. 
Anderson, Seventh Judicial District Court, issued on April 27,2009, as a matter of 
right pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2), Rule 12(b), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 59(a)(6), (a)(7), and Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-10, and 
the Utah Advisory Guidelines for Unmarried Parents. 
This Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal under Ut. R. C. P. § 
78-4-103 (2)(h). This case was filed to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Rules of Appellate Procedure 4 (b)(1), (A)(B)(C)(D). This case was transferred to 
the Court of Appeals on October 26,2009, pursuant to Ut. Rule of App. P. 42 (e) 
and Utah Rules Civil Procedure 11(d)(2) & Rule 50(b). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Appellant presents the following issues for review: 
Did the trial court err in finding that a substantial change of circumstance had 
occurred in the custody order it issued on February 2009, as compared to its 
August 2007 Judgment? 
Assuming that a substantial change of circumstances had occurred, did the trial 
court err by failure to properly apply the statutory procedure for terminating its 
joint legal custody of July 2008, and prior, August 2007 orders, that were 
l 
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dissolved; and then granted Petitioner sole legal and sole physical custody of the 
minor child? 
Did the trial court's repeated failure to equitably apply the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and the Rules of Evidence with Respondent, and result in deprivation of 
due process? 
Did the trial court err in finding that granting Petitioner sole custody and 
ordering Respondent to bear the entire cost of parent-time was in the best interest 
of the child? 
Is the Respondent entitled to an award of Attorney's fees and costs associated 
with this appeal, and the award of fees and cost that the trial court first granted and 
then revoked, and any other irrevocable fees and damages caused by lack of 
direction of authorities and procedure? 
STATEMENT OF THE CA$E 
This matter stems from a dispute over custody of the minor child, Ariann 
Lucinda Child, born August 9, 2004. The Parties were never married. Petitioner 
filed a 'Verified Petition for Paternity, Custody, and Related Matters' on January 
20, 2005, (Exhibit 2), without a parenting plan. 
On October 30,2007, the trial court issued a custody and parent-time order 
granting the Parties joint legal custody, with Respondent having sole physical 
2 
custody and Petitioner having standard parent-time with the minor child, in 
addition, to one overnight per week. (Exhibit 3, 'Order,' p. 2, f 2, 'Findings of 
Fact', p. l , t(a),p.5110,p.7114). 
On or about February 28,2008, Respondent informed Petitioner of her intent 
to move to Salt Lake City in search of more lucrative employment. (Exhibit 4). 
The following day, Petitioner filed a motion to modify the October 30, 2007 
parent-time order in light of the proposed relocation of Respondent and the minor 
child. (Exhibit 5, 'Petition to Modify,' and 'Affidavit'); Respondent proffered her 
answers to Petitioner's interrogatories. (Exhibit 5, 'Answers' and 'Response to 
Interrogatories'). Respondent and the minor child moved to Salt Lake City in 
April of 2008. 
The trial court held a semi-final trial hearing on Petitioner's motion to 
modify the existing parent-time order on July 9, 2008, whereat the Parties reached 
a stipulated agreement as to the parent-time schedule. (Exhibit 6). The Court 
made a minute entry decision regarding the parent-time schedule, child support, 
and attorney's fees issues. (Exhibit 7, 'Minute Entry for 7/09/08 Hearing, p. 14). 
Respondent prepared a Proposed Order and Findings as ordered by the trial court. 
(Ex. 6, 'Letter to Petitioner's Counsel'). 
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On September 29, 2008, Respondent submitted the proposed Findings, 
Conclusions and Order to the trial court for entry into the record. (Exhibit 8). On 
October 6,2008, Petitioner filed an objection to the proposed order (Exhibit 9), 
and moved to set aside the stipulated agreement that was entered at the hearing on 
July 10, 2008. (Exhibit 10). Respondent's counsel moved to withdraw for ethical 
reasons filed on October 28,2008, and followed standard protocol with a motion to 
stay proceedings on October 10,2008, in light of Petitioner's requests for re-
opening the trial. (Ex. 10). The trial court ordered a 'temporary orders hearing' on 
October 27,2008 without offering Respondent due process to prepare for a hearing 
without counsel. (U.C.R.P. 74 (a), (b)), and (Ex. 11, 'Order'). 
Hence, another bench trial was held on November 18,2008, to address 
Petitioner's motion to set aside the July 10, 2008 Order. (Exhibit 11). The trial 
court again made rulings regarding the parent-time schedule, the transportation of 
the minor child between Moab and Salt Lake, and various child support issues. 
(Ex. 7, 'Minute Entry, Hearing,' p. 16). Petitioner was instructed to prepare an 
order and findings but never did. Instead, Petitioner filed a series of motions to 
compel discovery and expedite the proceedings. (Exhibit 12). 
The third bench trial in less than a year was held on February 20,2009. (Ex. 
7, 'Minute Entry, Trial,' p. 17). The trial court withheld a final determination at 
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the hearing and instructed the parties to prepare written closing arguments. On 
March 13,2009, Petitioner filed another motion to reopen the hearing and 
submitted additional documents and evidence to the court. (Exhibit 13). 
On April 7, 2009, the trial court issued a 'Memorandum Decision' 
terminating joint legal custody and awarding Petitioner sole legal and physical 
custody of the minor child. (Exhibit 14). On April 27,2009, the Order's, Findings 
and Conclusions terminating joint legal custody and Respondent's physical 
custody of the minor child were entered in the record. (Exhibit 15). Respondent 
filed an objection to the order's and findings on April 28, 2009 (Exhibit 16), and a 
notice of appeal on May 27,2009. (Exhibit 17). 
Relevant Facts with Citation to the Record 
The Record on Appeal 
"The duty to marshal the evidence ""requires an appellant to marshal all of 
the facts used to support the trial court's finding and then show that these facts 
cannot possibly support the conclusion reached by the trial court., even when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the Appellee.'" The record shows that even in 
the most favorable to Appellee and the preservation of the trial court's ruling, 
Appellee had no cause of action against Appellant and that the trial court erred in 
5 
advocating a change of custody based on the previous order and findings, including 
the entire record. 
From the beginning, a 'Verified Petition for Paternity, Custody, and Related 
Matters' was filed on January 20, 2009 by Petitioner and his counsel in absence of 
a Parenting Plan as required by UCA § 30-3-10.8 (1). This submittal, which was 
notorized and signed by Petitioner's attorney, stipulated to several related issues in 
resolving the disputes between Appellant and Appelee. Appelee and Appellant 
were never married, Appellant is the primary caretaker of the minor child and that 
Appellant and Appelee had stipulated to Joint Legal Custody, Appellee and 
Appellant are both self-employed, Appellee is ordered to pay child support in 
accordance to Utah Civil Liability for Support Act, Appelee is entitled to liberal 
parent time, (among other issues that are not at question in this matter, (Ex. 2, \ 6, 
7, 8,9,10,16). There were a few stipulations that were not agreed upon by 
Appellant which were 1,15, and 25. After this filing, two years passed without an 
order to submit or signed order from the court, however, there were three notices 
of intent to dismiss from the district court. Finally, there was an Order Re: 
Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Mediator and to Set Mediation Deadline, 
whereas mediation occurred on June 22,2007. The Mediation Disposition was 
filed, but never consummated. The mediator reported tr^ e case as settled, but 
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Respondent had withdrawn her agreement within 24 hours after mediation. (Ex. 7, 
'Minute Entry.' p. 7). 
Next, a court date was issued on August 17,2007. The paramount issues 
presented at the trial included: visitation, custody, and financial support. The 
visitation issue was stipulated to in regard to parent-time with Appellee and 
Appellant. The embodied order and findings reserved joint legal custody, with 
Appellant maintaining primary physical custody (Ex. 3, 'Order Re: Verified 
Petition for Paternity, Custody, and Related Matters,' p.3, f 6(a). In the findings of 
fact it was noted that Appellant was a resident of Grand County three months prior 
to commencement of this action, (Ex. 3, 'Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law,' p. 5, If 8); however, in the February 20,2009 trial it was consummated that 
Appellant was not a resident of three months prior to present commencement of 
this preliminary action by Appellee, (Ex. 14, p. 1, f2). Financial issues relating to 
the August hearing were adjudicated by the court and are not relevant at this time. 
Contained in the Order that followed the October 17, 2007 trial, and hearing 
on October 30, 2007, included: the court found that Grand County to be the county 
residence of the child (Ex. 3, 'Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,' p. 5, f 8) 
and that the best interests of the child are to be protected by Appellant having the 
final say (Ex. 3, 'Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,' p. 5/6, t i l ) , child 
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support was outlined with Appellee's income based at $5000.00 a month, and 
Appellant's income as $883 per month; and income information may be 
exchanged on a yearly basis and support begins August 2007 (Ex. 3, p. 6 f 12). 
Appellee loaned Appellant $5100.00 representing advances in child support and 
other support and received a Judgment, (Ex. 3, p. 9, f 21). However, it was not 
determined whether Respondent would receive child support which is past due. 
In whether either party relocates UCA § 30-3-37 shall apply, (Ex. 3, p.10, f 
27), these findings shall survive and shall not be merged into any Judgment, 
decree, or order hereafter, (Ex. 3, p. 10, f 29) and that the child may travel 
internationally at the age of 3 Vi, (Ex. 3, p. 11, ^ f 30). Interestingly, this was 
already written into the order and not in objection on the October 30,2007 hearing. 
Subsequently, the parties were likely to agree on most issues, however if 
they disagreed Appellant would have the final say and Appellee could turn to the 
court for resolution, (Ex. 3, Huegley & Olsen, 'Order Re: Verified Petition for 
Paternity, Custody, and Related Matters,' p. 2, f 4, ^ f 5). Appellee travels on a 
frequent and continual basis, (Ex. 3, C. Halls, 'Order Re: Verified Petition for 
Paternity, Custody and Related Matters,' p. 4, % 8), and whether either party fails to 
perform his or her obligations under the Judgment the prevailing party in disputes 
in the exercise of joint custody may be required to pay all costs and attorney fees 
8 
incurred in this action, (Ex. 3, C. Halls, 'Order Re: Verified Petition for Paternity, 
Custody and Related Matters,' p. 7 f 18). 
In review of these final orders in question from 2007 for the appeal, it is 
important to emphasize that a submission of supplemental material was filed by 
Appellee's attorney, along with a parenting plan on October 15,2007 that also 
requested another hearing. An objection was then filed by Appellant's attorney on 
October 24,2007. The supplemental material was never consummated. A hearing 
was granted for a separate pleading in regard to inconsequential items that had no 
'real' basis as they were predicted by the 'oral' conclusion from the court. That 
additional hearing occurred on October 30,2007 to affirm what already occurred 
on August 17, 2007. This hearing reviewed the same issues that were 
consummated at the August 17,2007 trial, and finalized the 'Order Re: Verified 
Petition for Paternity, Custody, and Related Matters' and the 'Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law,' as set forth by Appellee's attorney. Appellant's attorney 
submitted a separate but almost identical 'Order Re: Verified Petition for 
Paternity, Custody, and Related Matters' and his 'Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law,' (Ex. 7, 'Minute Entry,' p. 9 & 10) on October 30,2007 in 
good faith upon the trial court's request. 
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In result of these orders and findings the court failed to apply the following: 
UCA § 30-3.10.3 (1), § 30-3-10.8 (1), § 30-3-11.3, and § 30-3-12. If the statutory 
guidelines had been applied before or at the hearing on August 17,2007, or even 
afterwards, both parties may have saved both time and money pertaining to the 
litigation surrounding this outcome, and for the betterment of their relationship in 
parenting and with the minor child. 
Four months later, Appellee's attorney filed a 'Petition to Modify Custody' 
on February 29, 2008. Again, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Utah Code 
annotated were ignored. The Petition to Modify made a false statement in 
asserting that 'Petitioner was granted access to the child as set forth in the Order 
and Parenting plan.' (Ex. 5, p. 112). There was no Parenting Plan following 
October 30, 2007 submitted or included in the Order or Findings of Fact outlining 
such imperative issues as in a dispute resolution process, UCA S. 30-3-10.4 
(l)(c)(i)(ii), (3), (4), (4). Circumstantially, nor was there a 'Parenting Plan' 
provided at the time for filing a modification of joint legal custody to sole custody, 
'Petition to Modify,' (Ex. 7, p. 10). Consequently, there was no dispute resolution 
offered for the Appellant to defend her concerns and circumstances involved in 
Appellee's demand for custody. Joint legal custody was addressed in the 'Petition 
to Modify' as being 'logistically impossible.' (Ex. 5, p.i f 5). The 'Petition to 
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Modify' asserts that Appellant's role as primary physical custodian be relinquished 
to Appellee; in addition to severely minimizing Appellant's presence in the minor 
child's life. Various statements contained in the 'Petition to Modify;' in 
conjunction with Appellee's Affidavit filed on February 29, 2008 are notably 
repetitive to Appelle's legal berating and harassing of Appellant. For example on 
February 28, 2008 Appellant emailed to Appellee the first notice of moving from 
the Moab area (Ex. 4). Coincidentally, the 'Petition to Modify' was filed the next 
day, along with an Affidavit by Appellee that was signed on February 29, 2008. 
The email and 'notice' (Ex. 4) of moving did not suggest an immediate move, and 
certainly did not suggest a refusal to cooperate with Appellee on visitation or 
relocation. Nevertheless, on the same day of February 29, 2008 yet another 
motion was filed, 'Motion to Review Parent Time and Costs and For Contempt.' 
Presented with this motion, Appellee requested a hearing to review additional 
expenses that may be imposed on Appellant of transportation after clearly noting 
Appellant's financial situation. Parent-time was requested to remain as is, 
otherwise UCA S. 30-3-37 (5-7) be issued. Erroneously, it targeted Appellant to 
be in contempt though no contemptuousness had had an opportunity to be 
committed yet? Appellant was in compliance with UCA S. 30-3-37, and 
proceeding with acknowledgement to her responsibilities to do so. The abusive 
l i 
discretion in this request for a hearing warrants acknowledging UCA S. 30-3-10.4 
(5). As referenced above in the August 2007 hearing, the issue of relocation was 
addressed and written into the Order and Findings as UCA S. 30-3-37. Creatively 
enough, an Order for a hearing was issued on March 4, 2008 to determine 
transportation costs, visitation, and define parent time. Appellant was summoned 
and served to present answers for the Appellee's 'Order for a Hearing' on March 
20, 2008 (Ex. 5, 'Answers'), in which she answered. The next hearing occurred 
on April 1, 2008 and granted Appellee another hearing to review the Petition to 
Modify on May 6, 2008. Finally, but not really, a hearing was set for July 9, 2008 
to decide whether a change of custody was warranted by a substantial change of 
circumstance with no circumstantial evidence. 
Inside these four/five months revelating (4) hearings, there were several 
motions filed by both parties' attorney's. There were several legal arrows 
attacking the Appellant not in consideration of Appellant's cooperation with 
Appellee's parent-time. Aggresively, it was recited that Appellant was not 
cooperating, however, Appellee held a flag the entire stretch claiming he has spent 
up to 30/40/& 50 percent of additional time with the child. No evidence was 
provided that substantiated these contradicting approaches to abash Appellant, 
while attempting to validate his actions. 
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These motions and hearings caused undue financial, emotional and physical 
pressure through expediting and shortening time frames for responses that afflicted 
Appellant's attempts to maintain 'new' promising employment, settling in Salt 
Lake City, maintaining visitation with Appellee, and thereby reducing child 
support based on three weeks of new employment. Appellant wondered why the 
court order of August 2007 trial didn't really hold any weight? And, finally the 
motions and hearings achieved a most devastating impact on the best interest of the 
child by allowing the Appellee and the court to deny its original assessment of 
respecting its own decree of October 30,2007, whereas, the court decided the 
custodian may make final decisions with regard to the child's best interest, 
including residence, and other factors that must be taken into consideration with 
UCA S. 30-3-10.3 (l)(a), (d), (6), (7). 
The July 9, 2008 hearing determined that a substantial change of 
circumstance had not occurred since the August 2007 hearing, (Ex. 6, p.l (1). 
However, the court did indicate that child support would be modified based on 
Appellant's new employment of 2 months in less than 1 years' time from the 
August 2007 Order and changed its determination to $3633.00 per month for 
Respondent and $3583 for Petitioner. (Ex. 6, p.l 12). This reduced child support 
immediately. The court also ruled that Appellee would be allowed to deduct an 
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additional $50.00 from child support because of an award of attorney's fees, (Ex. 
6, p. 2,13) that was recalled from one hearing to the next. The last issue resolved 
at this hearing was visitation that was outlined and stipulated to as usual. (Ex. 6, p. 
2,15). 
Two months later Appellant's attorney submitted the 'Proposed Findings.' 
(Ex. 8, 'Order, (unsigned')). An objection was filed in response on October 6, 
2008. (Ex.9). In addition to another 'Motion to set aside Agreement of 7/11/08. 
(Ex. 10). In pursuit of the onslaught, again on October 6, 200 Petitioner's counsel 
filed 'Petitioner's Affidavit in Support of Motion to Set Aside Agreement of 
7/11/08,' 'Request for Trial Setting,' and 'Request for Hearing on Temporary 
Orders.' Appellant's attorney then responded with a 'Supplemental Memorandum 
to Motion to Stay Proceedings Submitted by Respondent' on October 10, 2008. 
(Ex. 11). In clearing the air, Appellant's attorney filed a 'Notice to Submit for 
Decision' on October 22, 2008. (Ex. 11). Neither, Notice to Submit pertaining to 
the floating order was recognized by the court with regard to Appellant's attempts. 
Although, another hearing was scheduled on October 27, 2008 to determine the 
November 18, 2008 for temporary orders. (Ex. 11). 
Thereby, Appellant points to Ut. R. C. P. VI, 103, (a)(1). Under Ut. R. C. P. 
74 (c), Appellant asserts that a 'Notice to Appoint New Counsel or Appear in 
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Person' was presented on October 24,2008, however, an 'Order" for another 
hearing was set for November 18, 2008, on October 27,2008, and the recorded 
withdrawal on October 30, 2008. Appellant did not waive the time requirement for 
future proceedings to be held within 20 days after Notice to appoint New Counsel. 
Appellant was left with no opportunity to do so, considering that a court date was 
set and ordered before the actual withdrawal occurred. In conclusion, Appellee's 
attorney filed his motion premature to Appellant's attorney's withdrawal. 
The November 18, 2008 hearing provided consistent results with the July 9, 
2008 in addressing visitation, child support, and deductions. Thereby, granting 
another court date for hearing the merits in which Appellee presumes a substantial 
change of circumstance has occurred to award a change of custody. Trial is then 
set for February 20, 2009. (Ut. R. C. P. 502 (b)(l-4)(A)(B)(i)(ii)(iii), (C)(ii)). 
According to the record this is the sixth hearing in less than 2 years from the 
verified order of August 2007 that sacrificed and prevailed that all resolutions will 
be resolved in a court room. (Ex. 3, C. Halls, 'Order Re: Verified Petition for 
Paternity, Custody and Related Matters,' p. 7 f 18). In retrospect, it is alarming 
that the parent's only avenue recognized by the court in settling disagreements or 
accusations was to pay an attorney for a motion or pleading. Appellant is 
flabbergasted that the efforts she has provided in trying to keep up with Appellee's 
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attorney were not rewarded with at least one pleading fiir counseling, dispute 
resolution, or a parenting plan. It surely is in the child'9 best interest to have her 
parent's participate in remedies such as these, before a court appearance would be 
required to assure that the claims/accusations are indeed valid. (Ut. R. C. P. VI, 
402). As it is, it is very difficult and time consuming and financially burdensome 
to argue testimonies of character when one parent, in short, simply may not 
appreciate of the other parent. 
Appellant's attorney failed to respond to opposing counsel's request for 
discovery and appropriate sanctions in early 2009. The 'Order' arrived on January 
20, 2009 with another pleading for 'Motion to Shorten Time Memorandum,' and 
'Petitioner's Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests Production of Documents' 
to Respondent. (Ex. 12). Yet, another overwhelming pleading for 'Expedited 
Motion to Compel Discovery and for Appropriate Sanctions' appeared on January 
5, 2009, and then the 'Order' on January 20,2009. (Ex. 12). Thereby, admitting 
evidence by default in a predicated 'Order' issued on February 9, 2009', Re: 
Expedited Motion to Compel Discovery, Memorandum, and for Appropriate 
Sanctions,' which is all reflective in the 'Findings of Fact' (Ex. 15, p. 5,18). 
On February 20, 2009 the court heard oral argument bifurcating the custody 
determination. The court did not make a ruling that day, and accepted written 
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closing arguments from both parties. Interestingly, the evidence listed on the 
"Exhibit List' of February 23, 2009, (Ex. 18) lacks an 'offered and received' 
notation where Appellee's counsel attempted to admit additional affidavits and 
motions to the court without following proper response time lines with Appellant's 
counsel. Thereby, depriving Appellant of due process. 
This is especially important because in the Memorandum Decision of April 
27, 2009 the court concluded this evidence and admitted 'new' evidence that was 
included in Appellee's closing argument that was not presented or available at the 
hearing in determining the custody issue, nor admitted. It is believed that the trial 
court judge accepted this evidence into his decision regarding whether a substantial 
change of circumstance had in fact occurred. (Ex. 14, p. 6, 2). Unjustly, it was not 
able to be contested by opposing counsel, or Appellant. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Before entertaining a motion to modify an existing custody order, the trial 
court must determine that "a material and substantial change of circumstances has 
occurred." UCA § 30-3-10.4 (l)(a)(c)(i)(ii). The trial court's finding that a 
substantial change had occurred rests primarily on Respondent's relocation from 
Moab to Salt Lake City, after the issuance of the October 30, 2007 custody order. 
Paragraph 20 of the 2007 Order states; "In the event that either party relocates, 
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UCA 30-3-37 shall apply." The trial court twice modified the parent-time 
schedule in order to accommodate the distance between the Parties and there was 
in fact no degradation of the relationship between Petitioner and the minor child. 
The trial court's orders of July 10,2008 and November 18,2008 made the joint 
custody arrangement both 'workable and appropriate under the circumstances.' 
See Huish v. Munro, 191 P.3d 1242,125, (Utah App. 2008). There was no change 
of circumstances between these two rulings and the order terminating joint custody 
on April 7, 2009. 
Accordingly, where the court made additional rulings throughout 2008, in 
evaluating a substantial change of circumstance it neglected to accommodate its 
original order for and in the best interest of the child (UCA § 30-3-10.4 (2)(a)(c), 
(3)(4)(5)). Whereas, visitation remained unchanged as the parties shared the cost 
of visitation before the move, and they shared the cost after the move. Petitioner's 
parent time remained unchanged and equal to that before the move. However, 
child support was affected significantly in reductions for both attorney's fees and 
new employment status. This surely was not in the best interest of the child. 
Before terminating a joint legal custody order the trial court must also 
determine that the parties have utilized the appropriate dispute resolution 
procedure and that the modification is in the best interest of the minor child. (UCA 
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§ 30-3-10.3 (7)). The Parties did not engage in or certify to the trial court that they 
had unsuccessfully tried mediation to resolve the Petition to Modify, and none was 
ordered by the court. UCA § 30-3-10.4 (l)(c)(i)(ii)). 
Similarly, the trial court failed to "give substantial weight to the existing 
joint legal custody order" or to "consider reasonable alternatives to preserve the 
existing order." UCA § 30-3-10.4 (2)(c) & (3). Rather, the trial court ignored the 
remedial affect of its two prior parent-time orders in July and November of 2008, 
which mitigated the impact of Respondent's relocation on the relationship between 
Petitioner and the minor child. 
The trial court failed to adhere to other protective elements of the child 
custody scheme as well. Neither party was required to attend a parenting class. 
Petitioner's 'Petition to Modify' did not contain the mandatory parenting plan. 
UCA § 30-3-10.8. The trial court ignored the moderating objectives of the 
parenting plan requirement and in doing so failed to ensure that the best interests of 
the child were in fact served by tearing the minor child away from her life-long 
caregiver. UCA § 30-3-10.9 (1)(3)(4). Prior to the termination of all of 
Respondent's custodial rights, the minor child had resided exclusively with 
Respondent, from birth to the age of 5. Petitioner's care of the minor child was 
limited to periods of parent-time. (Ex. 3, p. 2, f 2, p. 4, f 8). 
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Given the utter lack of Petitioner's experience raising the minor child, the 
trial court's finding that it was in the minor child's best interests to terminate 
Respondent's custodial rights and the joint legal custody order were pure 
speculation. The trial court acknowledged that there was a question "whether the 
Father has the emotional flexibility to manage the roller coaster of raising a five 
year old child." (Ex. 14, p. 4 f 1). By contrast, the trial court made no finding that 
the minor child was not "thriving, happy, or well-adjusted" for the five years she 
was in Respondent's care. UCA § 30-3-10.4(2)(c). Petitioner's counsel 
acknowledged this in his second set of interrogatories, just before the February 
2009 hearing wherein it references an affidavit by Irma, the pre-school teacher, 'I 
need to add that Ariann is a caring, bright, and well-mannered child.' (Ex. 13, 
'Affidavit of Irma Martinez," p.4, (9)) 
The trial court's Finding holds many such contradictions. Collectively, the 
trial court permitted evidence which should have been rejected per U.R.C.P. 103 
(1) (2)(d), Rule 502, 402,403,404, 608,903. The trial court found that following 
Respondent's relocation to Salt Lake City, "[t]he parties negotiated an agreement 
for the Father to have less frequent, but longer, visits with Ariann and to share 
transportation costs," which is effectively what was contemplated by the October 
2007 custody order; which states that UCA § 30-3-37 shall apply if either of the 
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Parties relocated. (Exhibit 3, Heugly & Olsen, 'Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, p. 7, f 30). At the same time the trial court found that "[t]his move 
effectively made it impossible for the Father to exercise the generous parent time 
schedule agreed to in August 2007." (Ex. 5, p. 2, f 5). The trial court's solution 
was to effectively destroy the maternal bond and stable relationship that the minor 
child had enjoyed her whole life. The trial court's findings are replete with such 
contradictions. 
ARGUMENT 
In observation of Appellant's attorney's closing argument Appellant submits 
an edited version with permissions from her counsel and evidence that is 
recognized in the record, in full. (Exhibit 23). 
In accordance to Ut. R. C. P. 11. (e)(2), Appellant applies the following 
submittal of recollection of audio recorded evidence that is contained in the record 
and can be objected to if Appellee decides to provide for a court certified 
transcribed version, based on Appellant's impecuniosity. Appellant swears it is 
accurate and word for word. 
The testimony verifies that Respondent has been brought to court for the 
residual effect of Petitioner's claims to the minor child. 
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Moreover, the testimony does not demonstrate a substantial change in 
Renee's circumstances that has negatively impacted her parenting ability or the 
functioning of the custodial relationship between Renee and Ariann. 
There is no evidence that Renee is less of a parent to Ariann than when the 
original custody order was entered by this Court or that Ariann has been neglected 
in any shape, way, or form. There is evidence throughout the record that the child 
has had 2 years of pre-school and dance, and the benefit of having both parents' 
involved in her life openly. 
It is distinguished that Renee long has had financial struggles. She has 
borrowed money from people. At times, she has repaid those loans and some of 
those loans remain unpaid. This factual circumstance existed prior to the entry of 
the custody order and continues to exist subsequent to the entry of the order. 
1. Regarding; Money Borrowed by Respondent - August 2007 
MR. HALLS: Alright so now we're to the point where.. .you gave her twenty 
six hundred dollars to pay her rent 
MR. CHILD: Yes, and more... 
MR. HALLS: And part of the alternative if that didn't occur, what was your 
understanding of that the alternative... 
MR. CHILD: She would go to Illinois, and that her, this was her, this is what 
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she said to me at the time, that the option was that she could get a free apartment 
that her mother would arrange because her Mother owns, a rental, a low income 
housing rental place and that she could live there for free, and that's what she was 
considering doing.. .if she didn't get that kind of help from me. 
MR. HALLS: Has that been the indication, in other times when she's asked for 
help? 
MR. CHILD: No, that was specific to that time in February. 
MR. HALLS: So, your thought about that time was she's asking me for this 
money or your daughter will be taken to Illinois. 
MR. CHILD: Yeah. 
MR. HALLS: Um, alright, you've made a summary of.. .when you made 
these.. .approximately how much is the advances that you've made total? 
MR. CHILD: Well, in two thousand and six... uh, you know my obligation, 
child support obligation is about was about forty eight, forty nine hundred dollars a 
year. But, I gave Renee, sixty eight hundred dollars approximately. In two 
thousand and six and then so far the beginning of two thousand six to right 
now.. .ah.. .I've given her um., sixty-seven hundred dollars in, and you know my 
obligation is more like thirty-two hundred dollars at this point. I mean I'm way 
ahead.. .and by Renee's own admission at the time when we had this conversation 
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in February, when she, wanted me to pay extra rent, to stay, here and all that? By 
her own admission, that even at that point I was paid up in child support, until right 
now, in fact until August she said august, and I've always given this money. Um, 
we've always had an anecdotal way of talking about it, as if it's an advance of the 
money I'm going to give you for child support in the future.. .Anyway, so that's 
why I've been doing it. 
MR. HALLS: Alright so, I want to explore that for a moment. I was gonna ask 
you, ah, you've made a comment that you gave her some money for a car.? Down 
payment, car or to buy a car. 
MR. CHILD: That I've considered as a gift. 
MR. HALLS: Alright so there's... a coupled of different things? 
MR. CHILD: That's that's about three years ago... 
MR. HALLS: Your, you're considering them as gifts or loans and your 
considering some as advances on child support. 
MR. CHILD: The, the two-thousand dollars for the car is the only thing I 
consider as a gift, she asked me for help to buy a good safe car to put Ariann in...I 
said yeah, okay, I'll do that. And, so I gave her a check for two-thousand dollars, 
and that was two thousand and five. I've never, never tried to recoup or deduct 
that from anything, that's, that's just there. 
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MR. HALLS: Alright, do you have documents.. .other materials from Renee 
that would indicate that she also treated this as an advance on child support? 
MR. CHILD: Yeah, this, I do have a copy of this too. I've sourced checks and 
receipts that either Renee or I created that agreed to that really show, they kind of 
show a mish-mash of terminology., .sometimes it says advance on child 
support.. .sometimes it says loan. You know it's always been regarded, whether 
it's in writing or in a conversation that these are advances in child support. I was 
in no position to keep gifting her thousands of dollars.. .I'm currently, by my 
calculation ahead at this day that we sit right here, by about fifty four hundred 
dollars. 
MR. HALLS: Okay, let me go on to something else. You indicated fifty nine 
thousand dollars as paid for the property. Is that the total amount for the property, 
or is that just your share. 
MS. GLOBIS: That's the total amount for the property without interest. 
MR. HALLS: So, your share of that was a quarter, fifteen thousand dollars 
roughly. 
MS. GLOBIS: That doesn't include interest. A twenty year installment loan. 
MR. HALLS: Of a hundred and...Are you up to date payments on that 
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property? 
MS.GLOBIS: Up until June. 
MR. HALLS: Have you been taken to small claims court by the other partners? 
MS. GLOBIS: No. 
MR. HALLS: Have you been threatened with that? 
MS. GLOBIS: No. 
MR. HALLS: You were talking about... 
MS. GLOBIS: I'm in the process of selling tha...trying to sell the land. That's 
the main reason, I was possibly, I'm working towards that. 
MR. HALLS: You were talking about the twenty-six hundred dollars, twenty 
six hundred and sixty dollars that you say that that was absolutely a gift? There 
was never any conversation, or anything about that loan or advance on child 
support, remember that. 
J. ANDERSON: Now, you've reached a stipulation about those claims, did you 
want to cover it. Can you give me a thorough background Mr. Olsen? 
MR. HALLS: Well, Your Honor, I still want to convince the court I guess, that 
this this was child support or it was something and it goes to her credibility, 
(laughs). You remember that. Is that still what you want to say? 
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MS. GLOBIS: You'll have to repeat the question, cause... 
MR. HALLS: You indicated, in no uncertain terms, that that was a gift... 
8/17/07: 2:23 p.m. 
MR. HALLS: .. .given to you by Greg that he never expected payment. The 
twenty-six hundred and sixty dollars paid on your rent. 
MS. GLOBIS: I have definitely indicated that after a certain point, like Greg 
said, you know the last time he wrote a child support check was in February, 
officially for four o nine. Everything beyond that we didn't discuss. I sent Greg an 
email, which is that document you have. 
MR. HALLS: Alright, I'm talking about the twenty-six hundred and sixty 
dollars, specifically. 
MS. GLOBIS: Right, there was no terms on how it would be paid back, 
whether it was a gift. I mean basically, he stopped giving me child support, but he 
was willing to pay a bill and was willing to pay my rent. So, I don't know, you tell 
me. 
MR. HALLS: Do you remember under direct examination you said it was a 
gift, your Attorney asked you, and you said it was a gift. Was it a gift or was it a 
loan. 
MS. GLOBIS: I think that's up to Greg. 
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MR. HALLS: What is your perception of what that was I want to know what 
you think? 
MS. GLOBIS: My answer is up to Greg. I think he'll take me to court and if I 
don't know? 
MR. HALLS: Your Honor, can I require the court whether you remember that 
testimony. I, I'm asking a simple question; I mean maybe you can instruct the 
witness. 
J. ANDERSON: What do you mean instruct the witness, I want her to answer 
the question. 
MS. GLOBIS: I did. 
J.ANDERSON: Objection. The witness, herself is sustained. She has 
answered it, may not be satisfied with the answer.. .her answer. 
MR. HALLS: Do you remember that's testifying a few moments ago, half an 
hour ago, that the twenty-six hundred dollars was a gift. 
MS. GLOBIS: (sigh) 
MR. HALLS: You don't. 
MS. GLOBIS: You wrote it down; I've been asked alot of questions right now. 
MR. OLSEN: I'm gonna object it's been asked and answered. 
J.ANDERSON: Sustained. Let's go on. Let's go onP I happen to remember. 
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She did say it was a gift. She was under the oppression then too. But, pressed by 
her lawyer, she said 'gift.' 
2. Regarding Relocation - August 2007 
MR. HALLS: Alright, Ms. Globis, you made a comment, if you, if you 
weren't able to support yourself you would have to make a new life 
somewhere else. You stated that you told Greg that. 
MR. OLSEN: Objection. That's beyond the scope of direct. She did not 
state that. 
MR. HALLS: It can be beyond the scope of direct. 
J. ANDERSON: I'm gonna allow it. 
MR. HALLS: Did you basically tell him that you would make a new life 
somewhere else, that you would move with Ariann, if you didn't have the 
money that you needed here? 
MS. GLOBIS: I'm doing the best I can here, if I think I can, if I get another 
job opportunity, if I can gain more profitable employment., more stable 
employment, I would. I would consider taking the offer and moving. 
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MR. HALLS: Okay, Ms. Globis isn't it true that your, one of your 
contingencies for you to remain here is if you get enough money to remain 
here? 
MS. GLOBIS: I wouldn't say that, no. I'd say, you know, I'm doing the 
best I can, and I'm hanging in there for now. 
MR. HALLS: That's not the question. Haven't you stated to him that if he 
could put up enough of the money for you to be able to pay your obligations 
here you would remain? 
MS. GLOBIS: Absolutely not. 
Regarding: Inheritence - August 2007 
MR. OLSEN: K, so you received an inheritance, correct? 
MS. GLOBIS: Yes. 
MR. OLSEN: There's been some testimony that its approximately a 
hundred and fifty thousand dollars, Is that correct? 
MS. GLOBIS: No. 
MR. OLSEN: How much have you received in total cash from the estate in 
the past few years'? 
MS. GLOBIS: Three. 
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MR.OLSEN: Three years. 
MS. GLOBIS: About a hundred and twenty thousand. 
MR. OLSEN: A hundred and twenty thousand, that a large sum. 
MS. GLOBIS: Yeah. 
MR. OLSEN: That's a large sum. What did you do with the money? 
February 2009: 
MR. HALLS: Did you ever tell Lindy Mcllwaine that your inheritance was 
$240,000? 
MS. GLOBIS: I did not ever get an inheritance of $240,000. 
MR. HALLS: Have you ever told Lindy Mcllwaine that you got an 
inheritance or that you received that $240,000? 
MS. GLOBIS: I don't remember what I would have told her but Greg seems 
to tell everyone about that, so maybe she didn't hear it from me. 
MR. HALLS: I think that's all I have.... 
Included in Greg's financial allegations regarding the reasons for 
change of custody, Greg has alleged that Renee received a substantial 
inheritance and squandered it away. Clearly, Renee disagrees with the 
assertion that she squandered the money away. Renee testified in February 
2009 that she received $98,000.00 from her Uncle Joey's estate, and her 
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brother was entitled to one-half. She, also, received $43,000.00 from her 
Uncle Jerry's estate. The money did not come in a lump sum, it came in 
pieces. In addition, she was required to send some of that money in order to 
collect the additional amounts. Renee testified that she paid at least 
$30,000.00 to attorneys for costs and fees involved in the litigation with 
Greg, she was required to purchase a house full of furniture when she moved 
from Greg's home, she had to provide for her daughter without financial 
support from Greg, plus she shared money with family, purchased a car for 
her mother, purchased a computer and paid for many other necessities. 
Again,, there was in fact no imminent grounds to suggest that a substantial 
change of custody had occurred in relinquishing the existing custody decree. 
(UCA § 30-3-10.4 (5). 
Most importantly, the inheritance was received throughout 2005. 
Thus, she received the funds prior to the entry of the custody order. This 
cannot be considered as a basis for determining that there has been a 
substantial change of circumstances since entry of the custody order. These 
financial situations were clearly acknowledged with the motions leading to 
the hearing on February 2008. (Exhibit 10, p. 6 f 18 & 119). The trial court 
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Judge could not have constituted a material and substantial change of 
circumstances that has occurred since entry of the custodial order. 
In this matter, Greg, also, attempts to use Renee's employment situation as a 
basis for the change in circumstances. The testimony, however, demonstrated that 
Renee has been doing architectural drafting as long as she has known Greg. 
Again, both before and after the custody order. (Ex. 2, p. 2 f 8 & 19)). 
Further, Renee's employment status is the same as it was prior to entry of 
the order awarding custody to Renee, and subsequently. Moreover, her 
employment situation does not constitute a substantial change of circumstances 
which has negatively impacted her parenting ability or the custodial relationship 
between Renee and Ariann. 
Regarding Employment - August 2007 
MR. OLSEN: Where do you work? 
MS. GLOBIS: I am a freelance architectural draftsperson and design. 
MR. OLSEN: How often do you work? 
MS. GLOBIS: As much as I can. 
3. February 2009 
Mrs: Flanders: What have you done to look for more work? 
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Renee: In December I established my own conlpany, Global Designs and 
Drafting, up in Salt Lake, that had a business license and had every 
intention to seek work with that and provide the same services I was in 
Moab, up in Salt Lake. 
Greg asserts that the move from Moab to Salt Lake City satisfies the change 
of circumstances requirement. It simply is not legally or factually sufficient to 
base a determination to reopen the custody question. First and foremost, to be 
legally sufficient, the change in circumstances must be subsequent to the custodial 
order and must not have been within the contemplation of the parties. Although 
the Findings designate Grand County as Ariann's residence, the Findings and 
Decree clearly contemplate a potential move of one of the parties. 
In addition, during the cross examination of Greg, the following occurred: 
Flanders: Mr. Child, you state that you were completely surprised by the 
idea that Renee would move from Moab. I'm going to show you a document, I 
haven't marked it as an exhibit but I'm going to ask you if you recognize it and if 
it's your signature on the next to the last page. May I approach, your Honor? 
Judge: You may. 
Child: This is a Stipulation that Rose Riley created, in 2005. What do 
you want me to say? 
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Flanders: Is that your signature on the next to the last page? 
Child: It is my signature yes. 
Flanders: And is that your handwriting? 
Child: Yes, but you know, this never went anywhere. 
The potential move from Moab by Renee was contemplated early in these 
parties' relationship and, thus, was acknowledged in the Findings and the Order. 
The evidence demonstrated that Renee is from Chicago and her family currently 
resides in Chicago. During her pregnancy, Renee went to Chicago for an extended 
time period and returned only when she determined that it would be best for her 
soon-to-be-born child to try to remain in close proximity to the child's father. 
Upon Renee's return to Moab, she moved into Greg's home for only a few months. 
Further, Renee was in and out during that time period due to the acrimony in the 
relationship between Renee and Greg. The testimony demonstrated that she lived 
in Greg's home, then moved into a friend's home, and then moved into a home that 
she rented. 
4. Regarding: Credibility of Witness-August 2007 
MR. OLSEN: Are you concerned that in making these decisions that Greg will 
substitute his desires for yours. 
MS. GLOBIS: He will overpower me in every situation. 
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MR. OLSEN: Has that been the history in the past. 
MS. GLOBIS: Yes. 
MR. OLSEN: Do you think that will continue in the future? 
MS. GLOBIS: Yes, because... 
MR. OLSEN: Why? 
MS. GLOBIS: Because that's the way everything has been with Greg, every 
time I say.. .it seems like every time I say, make a comment he twists it around and 
manipulates what I've said, and says it back to me.. .in a completely opposite 
direction of what I've said. And, it's really frustrating cause I'm just trying to 
communicate with him and he can't, he can't, just speak to me like candidly, and 
straightforward. 
MR. OLSEN: What about Greg's travel how do you think that will affect your 
ability, you and Greg, to make decisions? 
MS. GLOBIS: I think it's very difficult to make decisions on a daily basis, or 
even a monthly basis, in his case of absences where he is often times gone... 
MR. OLSEN: Has he been a problem in the past? 
MS. GLOBIS: Yes. There's, it's urn... 
MR. OLSEN: When was the last time Ariann went to the ER? 
MS. GLOBIS: She well, ER was last winter. 
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MR. OLSEN: Was Greg there with you? 
MS. GLOBIS: He was in Australia. 
MR. OLSEN: Okay, when was the last time that Ariann was really sick and 
had to go to the doctor? 
MS. GLOBIS: Um, that was in.. .last winter also, um, December was ER and 
January was really sick and went to the doctor. 
MR. OLSEN: What was wrong with her? 
MS. GLOBIS: In December she had, um, strep throat, and then in January she 
had some congestion, um, worrying me about breathing. 
MR. OLSEN: Was Greg present when these... 
MS. GLOBIS: I'm sorry? 
MR. OLSEN: Was Greg present during these doctor visits? 
MS. GLOBIS: No, no. 
MR. OLSEN: You ready Renee? May I remind you that you are under oath, 
okay? (pause) Let's pick off, ah, pick up where we left off. In your opinion, 
why will joint legal custody not work in this situation? 
MS. GLOBIS: Uh, sorry. Joint legal custody is not to the benefit of Ariann. 
From my perspective, of being her Mother, and dedicating everything I have to 
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my daughter. I feel it's extremely difficult to work with Greg, as/on a joint 
legal arrangement for making decisions with Ariann, because of his absence. 
MR.OLSEN: What do you mean? 
MS.GLOBIS: When he travels. 
MR. OLSEN: What effect does that have on you and Ariann? 
MS. GLOBIS: His lack of, his lack of knowledge of what's been going on. 
And, having to bring him up to date with the recent things that Ariann's been 
doing. He skips entire periods of time. It's difficult to/for him to make 
decisions with equanimity that are equal, of equal value, and I think that a... 
MR. OLSEN: Okay, when Greg addresses an issue with Ariann, okay, 
characterize to the court which end of the spectrum he's on. One, he ah, he gets 
hyperbolic about problems, and two he under-minimizes things. Where is he at 
in that spectrum? 
MS. GLOBIS: He minimizes all her problems. He basically says that he, most 
things I bring up as an issue, he brings them off as non-issues. Just states that 
he's not worried about it. And, often times, there's lack of communication on 
any issue, as well as, lack of his presence. And that. It is so important that you 
be present, as a father. To be like, to be...I think being present as a Father is 
everything to our children, and I think there's a huge yalue in that. I think that, I 
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think that Greg hasn't experienced like a complete dedicativeness to Ariann in 
that respect. 
MR. OLSEN: Where do you work? 
MS. GLOBIS: I am a freelance, architectural draftsperson and design. 
MR. OLSEN: Do you have a degree. 
MS. GLOBIS: No. 
The parties obtained attorneys when Ariann was approximately five months 
old. They have been in litigation since early 2005. The move from Moab 
clearly was within the contemplation of the parties before entry of the custody 
order. 
Greg did present some testimony regarding hostile behavior on the part 
of Ariann. Again, this could not support a finding of a change of circumstances 
or even that it is in Ariann's best interests for this Court to change custody. It 
cannot provide such support because the evidence demonstrates that this 
behavior only occurs when Ariann is with Greg or is in his care. Renee clearly 
testified that she had not seen such behavior. The other witnesses testified that 
they had seen this behavior when Ariann was in Greg's care. 
5. Re: 'Mother's relationship with child'- August 2007 
MR. OLSEN: Does she have a set routine, in her day? 
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MS. GLOBIS: She does at home. Yeah, I've kept her on, ya know, routines. 
MR. OLSEN: And, how does it impact Ariann, when Greg comes into town 
and begins to see her again? 
MS. GLOBIS: Uh, its, there's no more routine. She, she, she often comes back, 
and she doesn't listen, it takes her a little while to um, get back into the, um, I 
guess... 
8/17/07; 11:39 a.m. 
MS. GLOBIS: .. .it's an adjustment with just being back at home because it's 
just very, very different from, I don't, I'm not familiar with what Greg does with 
her at his house, but from what her routine is at home, it's just two different for 
her and I think it takes her a little while to realize where she's at again...and... 
MR. OLSEN: Is she the sort of child that needs structure, or is that not as 
important to her? 
MS. GLOBIS: I think all children need structure and I definitely think's she 
needs structure. She does so much better, when I've had her in daycare, she's 
going to the same provider. She loves daycare. And she gets very, ya know, 
the daycare provider's love her too, cause she's generally, she's really social, she 
loves other kids and she likes the routine. She likes being involved, like a sit 
down meal with other kids, and the whole thing, like she's, she definitely 
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gravitates to it. 
MR. OLSEN: Okay. 
MS. GLOBIS: I think she definitely gravitates to it. 
MR. OLSEN: Ok, but Renee hasn't actually sought to keep Ariann from you, 
isn't it true that she's actually come into town and actually tried to facilitate a 
good relationship between you and Ariann. Wouldn't you agree with that? 
MR. CHILD: By and large we stick to the days we agreed that I'll see Ariann. 
MR. OLSEN: Would you agree that she has worked to facilitate a good 
relationship with you and Ariann. 
MR. CHILD: Yeah. 
MR. OLSEN: Does Ariann have her own bedroom at your home. 
MR. CHILD: No. 
MR. OLSEN: Does she have her own bed to sleep in. 
MR. CHILD: No, she sleeps with both parents in their own bed. 
MR. OLSEN: Earlier in your testimony you said that you and Renee can agree 
on just about everything correct? 
MR. CHILD: About the child? 
MR. OLSEN: Correct. 
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MR. CHILD: Yeah. 
MR. OLSEN: Ok, have you ever had disagreements about whether Ariann 
should be in pre-school or daycare? 
MR. CHILD: No. 
MR. OLSEN: Is it true that in February you and Renee had had an argument or 
not, whether she should be in daycare or preschool? 
MR. CHILD: No. 
If the Court determines that Greg has proven a substantial change in Renee's 
circumstances that has affected her parenting ability, which we believe the 
Court should not so find, then the Court should look to the best interests of 
Ariann. In doing so, a significant factor to be weighted is the importance of 
maintaining a long standing custodial relationship. 
In this case, Renee always has had custody of Ariann. In fact, Ariann lived 
in Greg's home from her birth in August 2004 until October or November, 
2004. At most, three months. Ariann is five years old. Other than testimony 
from a few witnesses that Ariann has exhibited aggressive behavior when in 
Greg's care, the balance of the testimony is that Ariann is happy, well bonded 
with her mother, is learning her alphabet, is learning to read, enjoys significant 
time and activities with her mother and is a happy child. 
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The testimony, also, demonstrated that Ariann enjoys time and activities 
with her father, is a happy child, but, at times, exhibits violent behavior 
when in his case. 
pertinent facts - Greg's acknowledgment of the stipulation prepared by his attorney 
and his hand writing; 
evidence that Ariann has exhibited some negative behavior, but only when she 
has been with Greg - no evidence that it has occurred when she was with Renee; 
the Decree clearly contemplates a potential move by either party and applies 
30-3-37 to any such move; 
The evidence regarding debt obligations shows the same circumstances existing 
before entry of the decree and after - thus, not a change in circumstances; 
There was no evidence proving that a change in circumstances has occurred that 
has materially and substantially affected Renee's parenting abilities or the 
functioning of the custodial relationship between Renee and Ariann; 
The Court did make findings of fact to support its determination of custody and 
parent time - Greg has not proved a substantial change of circumstances to any of 
those findings that negatively affect Renee's parenting ability or the existing 
custodial relationship between Renee and Ariann; 
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Conclusion 
There are various grounds for basis of Appellant's appeal. First, the decree 
that designates Sole Physical and Legal Custody to Appellee. Appellant has 
mustered all of the evidence of the trial court's decree and all that is recorded in 
the record for a finding that fails to constitute dissolution of a Mother's rights, and 
fails in preservation of the standards of Utah Code Annotated and Utah Civil 
Procedural Rules, Rules of Evidence. This case has unfairly distributed custody of 
Respondent's minor child by failing to apply even the foremost resolution options, 
in which has created an extremely confusing and expensive course for raising a 
child between two parents who never married. (UCA § 30-3-12). 
Secondly, the current custody order and findings were not offered to 
Appellant's attorney for adequate review, before the order and findings were 
presented to the court. In result, the court refused to accept Appellant's objection 
to those findings and order even though they were recognized by U. R. C. P. Rule 
of Evidence 103 (2)(d), Rule 201(11), & 403 with objection about the use of 
evidence in a timely manner after an Order was issued. Questionably, the 
Respondent's objection was entered into the record the next day of the 'Order' 
being signed. However, on an earlier occasion the court did accept an affidavit and 
motion to set aside the agreement from the July 9, 2008 hearing, while the court 
ignored Utah Rule of Evidence 103 (2). In addition to the request for Notice to 
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an unjustified and unprepared court date of November 18,2008 for Appellant. 
Finally, asserting the lack of concentration with this case is that *.. .the court 
moved to reopen the hearing in March 2009, so that Petitioner could present 
additional evidence demonstrating that Mother lied when she testified about the 
status of her child care arrangements for Ariann at the Montessori pre-school in the 
Salt Lake City area.' (Ex. 14, p.6 f 2,); that was unjustified. 
The court also ignored a very important rule in this case concerning the 
credibility of the Respondent's testimony. The answers in which Petitioner's 
counsel persistently asked regarding determination of Respondent's wages were 
readily and easily accessed. Therefore, Petitioner's counsel asked questions to 
Respondent to deny her validity as a witness when there are two things that hold 
true. Petitioner's counsel could have retrieved the necessary information himself 
by making a phone call to the employer, or simply acknowledged and accepted the 
evidence that was submitted and accepted with the court that described 
Respondent's wage. The testimony of the Respondent is accurate and is reflected 
in the evidence and record. Conclusively, this arbitration of testimony to try to 
consider the Respondent as a non-credible witness is considered abusive in itself. 
(Rule 903). 
Incidentally, the testimony at any of the six trials in 2 years' time did not 
support a finding that the Appellee was deprived of his visitation or any default on 
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the part of the Appellant for not following court orders and procedure in regards to 
their child or court orders. There is not one stroke of evidence to authorize that 
Appellant have her UCA 30-3-10 removed and displaced to a Paternal Father mat 
did not want the child and vehemently attacked Appellant since the decision 
Appellant made to have the child, 'They did not initially agree whether it was wise 
for Mother to have a baby. (Ex. 14, p.l f 1). 
Statement of Relief Sought 
On appeal, Appellant seeks reversal of the order and enforcement of the 
UCA 30-3-10, which includes mediation with the Court of Appeals as the next 
immediate order presuming Appellee decides to adhere to Utah Code and 
Regulations of Paternal rights and privileges. 
Appellant, therefore, requests, this case be transferred to Salt Lake County, 
which has been the county of residence for the child and Respondent for a period 
of 2 years to date. 
Appellants' foremost concern is her child's emotional and psychological 
affect of the withdrawal of Appellant from the minor child's life and their 
relationship that they shared without any affects of financial hardships so stark that 
the child went without food, clothing, or good home. Appellant has protected the 
minor child from abuse her entire life, and Appellant is now empty handed with the 
choices the trial court has made. The minor child has always been recognized 
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minor child from abuse her entire life, and Appellant is now empty handed with the 
choices the trial court has made. The minor child has always been recognized 
through the trial's and testimony's as being a healthy, happy, child, (Ex. 13, 
'Affidavit of Irma C. Martinez,' p. 4, No.9). The trial court has permitted and 
impacted an innocent child with a cost that even Appellee cannot afford. 
Appellant begs the court to consider the impact on the minor child with 
regard to UCA Guidelines that were drawn up for both parents to have a beautiful 
relationship with the child, whereas, the parents must accommodate their lives and 
priorities to accommodate one another for the interest of their child. Appellant has 
strived to do this from day one so long as Appellee was willing. Appellant has 
stipulated to all Appellee's request's regarding visitation, (Ex. 16, 'Affidavit of 
Irma Martinez,'p. 4, No. 8), (Ex. 6, p. 2, (5), financial, (Ex. 6, p. 2, (3), (Ex. 14, p. 
10, (3), and countless other exhibits. However, Appellant is now destitute with 
financial obligations, and sold all of her assets in order to maintain a right that she 
believes cannot be exchanged for money. 
The court has not only exhausted Appellant's resources in defending her 
parental rights, but has mistakenly advocated Appellee to dominate the parental 
relationship; therefore, disrespecting the law and otherwise manipulating and 
abashing the Appellee for all that she has done for the minor child, (Exhibit 15, 
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(Exhibit 19 & 20, 'Expedited 'Exparte' Motion for Writ of Assistence and 
Affidavit in Support of Motion for Writ of Assistence, both on April 30,2009) 
(Exhibit 21, 'Notice of Entry of Orders,' May 4, 2009) 
(Exhibit 22, 'Writ of Assistence,' May 1,2009) 
Appellant believes that her child has been subjected to undue duress 
regarding the'Writ of assistance.' (UCA § 30-3-10.4 (5), §30-3.10.10(3,4). 
The primary victim is the minor child in a situation like this with little room for 
Appellant to react and digest the sacrifice of her child to a Father that she does not 
understand why he would pursue such an aggressive approach to claim custody 
with no evidence or history prevalent in this case thus far. Sadly, for the child 
there was no parenting plan submitted with the change of custody and the court 
gave no respect to the child in the dramatic altercation of her existing life with her 
Mother as she was whisked away to her Father. Though, police reports show no 
violence or abusive behavior by either party it is subject to the child's 
interpretation of her father's authority and approach in presenting Respondent as a 
victimized Mother. This aggressive approach to gain custody has allowed 
Petitioner to embark on enforcement of third party exchanges with police every 
time the minor child has visitation with the Mother. For this acknowledgement 
Appellant seeks an order for counseling to be provided for the parents and funded 
by Appellee. 
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Appellant also seeks an award of all of Appellant's fees and costs incurred in 
defending Appelant from Appellees' initial Verified Petition for Paternity, 
Custody, and Related Matters that has now escalated to Appellant's appeal. 
Appellant prays the Court of Appeals will adhere to the injustice that has 
been proven in this case and apply the corrections as necessary. Thank you for the 
honor of Pro Se Representation in this case involving my daughter. 
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time the minor child has visitation with the Mother. For this acknowledgement 
Appellant seeks an order for counseling to be provided for the parents and funded 
by Appellee. 
Appellant also seeks an award of all of Appellant's fees and costs incurred in 
defending Appelant from Apellees' initial Verified Petition for Paternity, Custody, 
and Related Matters that has now escalated to Appellant's appeal. 
Appellant prays the Court of Appeals will adhere to the injustice that has 
been proven in this case and apply the corrections as necessary. Thank you for the 
honor of Pro Se Representation in this case involving my daughter. 
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